Research
Peer-Reviewed Journal Articles
Li, Johnson C-H., Marcello Nesca, Rory M. Waisman, Yongtian Cheng, Virginia Man Chung Tze (2021), “A Robust Effect Size Measure Aw for MANOVA with Non-Normal and Non-Homogenous Data,” Methodological Innovations, 14(3), 1-12.
Donkers, Bas, Benedict G.C. Dellaert, Rory M. Waisman, and Gerald Häubl (2020), “Preference Dynamics in Sequential Consumer Choice with Defaults,” Journal of Marketing Research, 57(6), 1096-1112.
Li, Johnson C-H. and Rory M. Waisman (2019), “Probability of Bivariate Superiority: A Non-Parametric Common-Language Statistic for Detecting Bivariate Relationships,” Behavior Research Methods. 51(1), 258-279.
Donkers, Bas, Benedict G.C. Dellaert, Rory M. Waisman, and Gerald Häubl (2020), “Preference Dynamics in Sequential Consumer Choice with Defaults,” Journal of Marketing Research, 57(6), 1096-1112.
Li, Johnson C-H. and Rory M. Waisman (2019), “Probability of Bivariate Superiority: A Non-Parametric Common-Language Statistic for Detecting Bivariate Relationships,” Behavior Research Methods. 51(1), 258-279.
Selected Working Papers
The premier tool of choice architecture is to make one option a default that is obtained unless the consumer actively selects another option. While the immediate effects of default choice architecture (promoting choice of the default option) are well documented, little is known about potential downstream effects. A default’s immediate effects might carry over to future preferences and choices—promoting subsequent behavior aligned with the default—or it might be nullified by subsequent backfire effects. This research introduces and tests a theory of default carryover effects. It posits that a greater shift in downstream preferences and behavior in line with the default occurs when the default is more inconsistent with a consumer’s prior preference and when the experience of the initial choice’s consequences is more immediate. The intersection of these conditions facilitates preference updating in favor of the default due to experienced choice consequences that disconfirm expectations. Critically, this implies that carryover is suppressed when the default is preference consistent and/or when the experience of choice consequences is delayed. Evidence from five experiments supports this theorizing. The insights from this research help resolve seemingly contradictory earlier findings and advance our understanding of the nuanced interplay between choice architecture, prior preferences, choices, and consumption experiences over time.
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Shiri, Amin, Gerald Häubl, and Rory M. Waisman, “Mind Over Body in Games of Chance:” target: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
We offer a cognitive account of biased optimism in the context of gambling. We propose that the way in which gamblers interact with games of chance systematically influences the focus of their cognitive activity, with implications for the generation of biased optimism. The cognitive representations associated with one’s role in a game could focus either on doing (i.e., the physical actions required) or on thinking (i.e., the mental actions required), and the extent to which representations of a favorable outcome are activated depends on this role-based focus. We propose that gambling roles that focus on thinking are more likely to activate favorable outcome representations than roles that focus on doing and, as a consequence, lead to greater optimism. Evidence from 7 studies (N = 4975) supports this theorizing. The findings show that mental roles in games of chance promote greater optimism, which manifests in a preference for a mental role over a physical role when people have a choice between them, and results in greater willingness to take financial risk when gambling in a mental role compared to a physical role.
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Waisman, Rory M., and Gerald Häubl, “How Uncertainty Boosts Confidence in Consumption Decisions,” target: Journal of Consumer Research.
Can consumers gain confidence from uncertainty? Three studies reveal that consumers’ confidence in subjective decisions is boosted by incidental uncertainty. However, prior research showed negative effects of uncertainty on confidence. We reconcile these conflicting results in light of different effects of uncertainty on decision processing depending on the subjectivity (vs. objectivity) of the decision. Analysis of unstructured textual data from a thought listing protocol reveals that uncertain decision-makers engage in more structured thinking and they generate thoughts that are more favorable to their chosen alternative when making subjective decisions. Consequently, metacognitive monitoring of decision processing—experienced as faster, more fluent, and less conflicted—signals greater confidence.
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